

**Government and International Politics (GIP)
Centre for International Politics Working Paper Series
The University of Manchester**

No. 15 November 2005

**Political Cartoons and Conflict:
Revealing shifts in the Israeli Palestinian Conflict**

Ilan Danjoux
Centre for International Politics
University of Manchester

[*ilan.danjoux@manchester.ac.uk*](mailto:ilan.danjoux@manchester.ac.uk)

ABSTRACT

This work explores the ability of the political cartoon to provide insight into the interests and norms that lay the ideological foundation for strategic decisions in conflict. Using a constructionist approach to security, this paper argues that shifts in the portrayal of identity and enemy constructions found in cartoons offer insight into the nature, intensity and durability of conflict. As a form of visual satire, they represent a breadth of opinion absent from other forms of public discourse, able to represent not only material, but ideational national interests.

The Israeli - Palestinian conflict has long been challenging to researchers. The nature of the conflict appears, at times, to defy both the material interests and strategic rationality of the warring parties. The struggle has been described as possessing a primordial intensity, unpredictability and elusiveness that weighs heavily on academic research. Middle East experts have long understood the fundamental role of identity and symbolic rationality; Telhani, for example, is able to observe that “no student of Middle East politics can begin to understand the region without taking into account the ebb and flow of identity politics” (Telhani 2002: 2). While the powerful influence of identity on the region has long been accepted, it was the perceived stability of these identities that proved to be the greatest hindrance to analysis. It was not until the failure of traditional International Relations theory to satisfactorily explain the end of the Cold War or the resulting surge of inter-ethnic violence that traditional approaches were reconsidered (McSweeney 1999: 1). Constructivism and Security Studies emerged to compensate for the theoretical blindspots of existing approaches (McSweeney 1999: 2).

A cornerstone of this new research was the relationship between identity and strategic behaviour (Barnett 1996: 401). Constructivism’s impact lies in stressing that national identities are neither fixed nor stable (Mitzen 2003:8). As contextual derivatives of the concerns and desires of the community they serve, different identities prioritize different material, ideational and moral aspirations. Consequently national interests are as diverse and malleable as the identities they serve (Hopf 1998: 193). The resulting susceptibility to change can result, at times, in dramatic shifts in policy that only become comprehensible when the undercurrents of identity change are considered. In this way, variations in national identity directly impact both security concerns and policy (Jepperson 1996: 60).

Every identity identifies itself *in relation* to outsiders, or an ‘other’ (Barnett 2002: 62). It is important to bear in mind that this ‘other’ is not inherently antagonistic. If this were the case, Stein argues, every identity would be in a perpetual state of conflict (Stein 1996: 191). Conflict and the sanctioning of political violence originates from the perceived incompatibility of interests with external actors, making identity inseparable from

security (Katzenstein 1996: 19). Security policy defends these interests against perceived vulnerabilities, defined as actors, trends or policies that threaten the realization of national goals (McSweeney 1999: 3). “Identity provides a handle on who is considered to be a desirable alliance partner” and who is considered an enemy (Barnett 1996: 446). Changes in the construction of the ‘other’, from vilification to recognition, or rival to enemy are fundamental to the decision between the use of diplomacy or force.

Enemy images and threat construction have long played a role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The formidable Israeli armed forces has long displayed a siege mentality as the guardians of a besieged refuge surrounded by enemies, convinced that military complacency will result in the imminent destruction of the state and usher in an Arab-instituted Holocaust (Barnett 1996: 435). Palestinians perceive a global Zionist conspiracy, with Israeli policy, even when it appears to benefit Palestinians, as the plotting and scheming of imperialists (Rowland 2002: 163). It is little wonder that the region has long been immersed in exclusionist myths, demonizing ideologies and antagonist group histories that legitimate and necessitate violence (Ramsbotham 2005: 117).


An ‘enemy’ image is more than antipathy or dislike, but is based on a belief that one’s values, interests or survival are directly threatened by the actions or even existence of the other group (Luostarinen 1989:125). ‘Enemy’ images anticipate hostility, exaggerate threat, and sanction violence, dismissing any conciliatory action as uncharacteristic, unintended, or strategically disarming (Steele 2005: 528). Because symbolic systems are readily pushed to their logical conclusion, monitoring these constructions act as a barometer of the direction, intensity and durability of conflict (Entman 1993: 54) (Rowland 2002: 1). The more irrational or menacing the enemy is perceived to be, the narrower the available range of diplomatic action becomes, and the more justified we feel in hating our enemy (Stein 1996: 190) (Conner 1998: 97). The depiction of an enemy as vermin spreading across the region implies extermination, not negotiation. Force against Barbarians acts in the only language *they* understand. The traditional preclu-

sion to extreme political force is lifted. The greater the menace, the more permissible the aggressiveness to protect our nation, our children and our civilization (Ramsbotham 2005: 117). To not engage such an enemy implies moral weakness.

Constructivist approaches hold that identities are constructed inter-subjectively and are verifiable through “*representative practices*” such as discourse and symbolic analysis (Khan 2004: 53)(Hall 2002: 4). Shifts in the interests and norms of behavior that influence security policy are visible in discourse (Khan 2004: 37). Because actors conduct themselves in accordance with whoever they imagine themselves to be, a change in the perceived Self is indicative of a likely change in action (ST-CC p. 29).

The 1980s marked a significant shift in Palestinian political behavior, encapsulated in the outbreak of the 1987 Intifada. Changes in the political environment of the West Bank and Gaza led to a shift in the identity and interests of Palestinians from survivors to activists and from seeking the elimination of Israel to committing themselves to a struggle for the end of the occupation (Rowland 2002, 172). The

cartoon on the right portrays Handale, a dispossessed Palestinian refugee boy who was the quintessential Palestinian depicted in the Cartoons of Naji Ali, widely regarded as one of the foremost Palestinian cartoonists until he was assassinated in 1987. With his back turned to the audience in protest of the world’s complacency in the face of Israeli crimes, he waited, steadfast for justice. He bore witness to the injustice experiences by his people and was the con-



scious of the world.



The 1980s saw a radical shift in Palestinian representation in political cartoons that mirrored the change in Palestinian political behavior. Handale had been replaced by Abu Abed, defender of Palestine whose pro-active approach placed him not on

the sidelines of history waiting for justice, but as the impetus of change at the forefront of the struggle. Steadfastness was replaced by Palestinian empowerment.

Every identity possesses a legitimate sphere of action, prohibiting certain policies and sanctioning others (Farell 2002: 50). For example, Islamic identities that perceive Jerusalem as a *Waqf*, or divine trust, are incapable of accepting policies that would relinquish control of the city's holy sites to unbelievers without throwing into question the legitimacy of their Muslim identity.

A key challenge for discourse analysis arises in trying to discern discourse that reflects general public opinion from that which seeks to manufacture it (Kowert 1996: 485). In the Middle East, as in other arenas, discourse is consciously employed as a strategic tool both to garner both domestic support and to manipulate foreign patrons (Khan 2004: 73).



and suffering in vying for international political and economic support (Wolfsfeld 2001: 114). Each competes to be perceived as the victim, casting their 'other' as wanton aggressors. Wolfsfeld describes this competition as a struggle between 'modern Gladiators' with "one eye on the enemy and the other on the crowd, [for] the final outcome may very well depend on the judges sitting in the stands" (Wolfsfeld 2001: 118).

This struggle over identity is not, however, exclusively directed at foreign audiences. The contested nature of identity has been translated into a struggle to define the Israeli and Palestinian identities themselves. There is an "increasingly powerful belief on both sides that the struggle over the news media can be just as important as the battle on the

ground” (Wolfsfeld 2001: 113). A quote by *Manhigut Yehudit* leader Moshe Feiglin, in a speech given in January 2005, exemplifies this effort:

I'm calling for a complete revolution in Jewish identity. We need to identify as Jews through the Torah, because you can't identify the enemy until you identify yourself. Once you know who you are, and once you know that what you are doing is justice, fighting the enemy becomes simple. (Shapiro, 2005)

In response to these challenges, this paper proposes to expand the analytical toolset available to conflict researchers to include the political cartoon. As satirical devices highly dependent on representational analogy, cartoons act as reflectors of shared domestic opinion that, though widely held, is often not openly shared. Cartoons function as revealers of known truths, with a limited capacity to present new or unfamiliar analysis (Omri 1998: 138; Coupe 1969: 88). In doing so, they may echo the unspoken concerns of a society.

Why Cartoons?

Three aspects of cartoons make them insightful tools for discourse analysis: their capacity to deal with relations of opposition, to tap into underlying levels of feeling and sensitivity and to provide ‘contextual shielding’.

The cartoonist device of opposition, where complex situations are reduced into an intelligible clash of opposites, mirrors the necessity of identity politics to distinguish the self from outsiders. Implicit in cartoons is “a righteous ‘we’, superior to a foolish, corrupt or evil ‘them’” (Duss 2001: 966). By reducing events to a clash of opposites, cartoons provide a unique insight into identity. Opposition clearly reveals the identity and character of the ‘other’, and the interests and expected behavior of the ‘self’. *In this cartoon we see the righteous ‘we’ as Palestinian negotiators facing Israelis, whose decep-*





tive character and desire of war is obvious. The suggested course of action is not difficult to ascertain.

Even in situations where an ‘other’ is not overtly portrayed, the character and interests of the ‘other’ are implied (Morris 1993:201). In this cartoon, the head of Zaka, an organization that gathers body parts from terror attacks, is seen as picking up the remnants of peace, and preparing the dove for burial. The implication is that peace is one of us, murdered by Palestinian militancy, upon whose shoulders rests the responsibility for the death of the Oslo Peace Accords.

Though less frequently, the ‘other’ can be presented as an abstraction or unknown, revealing a period of acute unpredictability, where threats appear to loom around corners. This heightened anxiety often leads to the quest to find enemies and personify fears in a desperate attempt to “replace uncertainty with insecurity.” (Farell 2002: 65) One is reminded on the US policy after 9-11. This cartoon appeared in Al Hayat al jadeeda and portrays the lawlessness in Gaza as the looming threat facing Palestinians.



At a different level, cartoons also capture the contentious, irrational and unsubstantiated fears of a community. “Cartoons reflect what the public finds absurd, worrisome and desirable without necessarily being able to say why” (Giarelli 2003: 954). Political cartoons are

the emotionally laden expression of perceptions that require neither coherent nor credible articulation. They capture how people feel, rather than think with regards to what is happening. (Press 1981:62). Importantly, emotionally charged analysis is no less actionable than materially verifiable accusations (Miall 2001: 10). In conveying sentiments too difficult to articulate, with no verbal equivalent, or that would be otherwise politically impossible, the cartoon reflects the opinions often absent from other forms of discourse (Morris 1993:196; Kress 1996:17). In the above cartoon, a mother carries her dead child, as the caption above reveals her lament that "everybody is busy with something else", capturing the sense of isolation and despair of the Palestinian people.



As satire, cartoons excuse opinions too offensive, socially unacceptable or politically dangerous to be voiced in conventional discourse (Conner 1998: 110; Slymovics 1993: 24). Their joking and 'punchy' nature would translate into a critical, scathing and de-humanizing attacks on groups and leaders if articulated discursively (Alba 1967: 121). It is this potential to reveal latent hostility

and suppressed feeling that is the focus of this study. *This cartoon reveals an Israeli perception that Arabs are violent by nature. The father, turning to this son appears says "one day, all this will be yours", proud to offer him a land engulfed in violence. He is either oblivious or undisturbed by the chaos that surrounds them. Satire excuses the indictment, that Arabs are a violent, lawless people, an opinion that would be unacceptable in the mainstream press.*

The linguistic, contextual and cultural barriers that shield discourse from external scrutiny serve to make it a 'safe' arena for internal dialogue. Cultural and historic references infuse meaning by drawing analogies that are often lost to the uninformed reader. Many of these visual metaphors are implicit rather than explicit and are open to a broad range

of possible interpretations. The meaning of the cartoon is suggested but understood by insiders, yet any specific interpretation remains deniable to outsiders (El Rafaie 2003:91). Without the necessary situational understanding, the cartoon's message is can be easily easily misconstrued or manipulated.



The cartoon below appeared in 2003 the *Independent*, a British daily and has been charged with being either anti-Israel or anti-Semitic by members of the Jewish community. It portrays Israel as a modern day King Kong, or Godzilla, alluding to a clash of civilization with an animalistic people. While appearing to present Israel or Jews as savage

murders of children, a contextual understanding of the cartoon reveals a significantly different meaning.

This cartoon was drawn in the run up to the 2003 Israeli elections, in which Ariel Sharon (depicted in the center of the frame) was a candidate for Prime Minister. In it he says, "What's wrong... You never seen a politician kissing babies before?" The cartoon makes the argument that the September 17th air strikes on Gaza city was an election ploy by Ariel Sharon to win the 'security vote'. A contextual reading of the cartoon shows that the cartoon is not a condemnation of Israel, but a warning to her citizens of an apocalyptic descent into hell.

The scene contains a visual reference a well-known European painting, Goya's *Saturn Devouring One of his Sons*. The painting depicts the myth of the god Saturn, or Cronos, who, on learning that his death will come at the hands of one of his sons, is driven by fear to devour them. The cartoon warns of the depths of perversion to which fear can drive people. While the scene can



be understood as the murder of Palestinians, with the child representing the innocent, it

equally invites a more complex interpretation. Just like Saturn, Sharon is in the midst of devouring his *own* sons, the sons of Israel. By supporting Sharon, the Israeli citizenry, overwhelmed by fear, will be sending their own children to their deaths. The association that fear leads to a descent to hell resonates in an election campaign in which Sharon's popularity was bolstered by an Israeli public gripped by the fear of continued terror attacks. Voting for Sharon out of fear may lead to the Israeli voters devouring their children through continued bloodshed. Israel is not the enemy; Sharon, and the fear he mongers is. A vote against him will save Israeli children, Palestinian children and the innocent. It is a plea for the survival, not the destruction of Israel.


It becomes evident that a cartoonist relies upon an audience's cultural memory and native understanding of symbols to successfully deliver both humour and meaning (Morris 1993:197; Omri 1998: 139; Werner 2004; Giarelli 2003: 946). Success is contingent upon the contextual understanding of those references. Devices such as shading, sizing, and personification help reveal the realities of a situation, assign blame and create mood. Visual referencing of emotionally charged metaphors and cultural symbols instantly infuses meaning into the events being portrayed (El Rafaie 2003: 91). Exaggeration, for example, succeeds because it distorts the physical attributes of objects or actors familiar to the the reader (Giarelli 2003:947). These may be religiously inspired, with struggles between disproportionate adversaries referenced as a 'David vs. Goliath' struggle, historically derived with ill-advised negotiations presented as 'Munich Style Appeasement', or culturally inferred, with a politician, for example, making 'New Year's resolutions' implying insincere promises (Morris 1993:200). These two cartoons illustrate the point. In only one or two words, each are able to convey a depth of meaning indiscernible to the uninformed reader.



In the Palestinian cartoon on the left, the woman cries 'Ya, Mo'a'tasam!'. It requires cultural knowledge that Moatasam was a Muslim Caliph, who, in response to the pleas of a dishonored Muslim woman by Roman soldiers in Egypt, threat-


ened the Byzantine empire with an army that stretched from Baghdad to Constantinople if an apology was not given. It captures the honour, integrity and ability Muslim leaders once possessed to defend the honour of the Arab nation.

The Israeli cartoon on the right presents a boat called the *Altaleena 2*. The reference is to the original *Altaleena* that was bringing in supplies to support Israel in the War of Independence. However, rather than supply the newly established Israeli Army, it was intended for *Irgun*, a militant Israeli faction. The Israeli army opened fire on it, when they refused to relinquish control to the Israeli state, risking the start of an Israeli civil war. The *Altaleena* continues to represent the fear within Israel of a potential civil war.



It is this contextual understanding that makes cartoons an arena of internal discourse where opinions can be expressed that are either invisible or excusable to outsiders. Undoubtedly, a researcher wishing to make methodological use of cartoons must possess a contextual familiarity comparable to that of the intended audience. (Press 1981: 29). In addressing this, Walt Werner outlines what he describes as the four required levels of understanding for successful cartoon analysis.

First, the researcher must be familiar with subject matter and characters being referenced in the cartoon. The key players in any political arena are an obvious requirement in the interpretation of the cartoon's message. Secondly, the mechanics of the cartoon itself, the significant symbols and artistic devices, must be understood. Third, as demonstrated, references to historical events and individuals are essential for a cartoon's analysis. (Werner 2004). Finally, the political setting and the potential or actual pressures facing the cartoonist is necessary for any analysis (Werner 2004).



This cartoon, published in *Al Ayaam*, reveals the censorship that faces Palestinian cartoonists. Akram Haniya, *Al Ayaam*'s founder and a long standing friend of Arafat, readily engaged in such censorship. This cartoon represents an overt form of censorship, with the original wording *airbrushed* out and replaced with

"Those who are outside are in deep trouble like us". Often cartoons are simply not published if they are deemed to be undesirable, offensive or politically sensitive.

Initial Findings

While theoretically sound, the real test of the viability of cartoon analysis is an empirical analysis in which a correlation between changes in cartoon style and content and the behavior of actors is observable. As is evident, the case study I've chosen is the Israeli Palestinian conflict.

The prospects for peace between Israelis and Palestinians demands a fundamental transformation of the identity of 'self' and the recognition of the 'other' (Telhani 2002: 18). The Oslo Peace Accords constituted such a watershed, breaking long-standing symbolic taboos on mutual recognition (Rowland 2002: 223). Barnett argues that more than a territorial negotiation, Oslo was fundamentally a transformation of identity (Barnett 2002: 59). Changes in the stereotypes associated with the 'other' side altered acceptable norms of behaviour and associated security risks (Schultz 1999: 144). Peace was transformed into not only an acceptable policy, but the preferred response to each party's security concerns (Barnett 2002: 61). The failure of the peace process was perceived as a greater threat to security. Identity was recast in opposition to the 'enemies of peace'. Rowland & Frank state that the negotiations did not take place between Israelis and Palestinians, but between Labour Zionist and Palestinian Nationalist identities (Rowland 2002: 3). Each side successfully recast the other from *Arab* to *Palestinian*,

and from *Zionist* to *Israeli*. The implication of this change was a humanity and legitimacy of the 'other' never before acknowledged (Schultz 1999: 149).

The rapid collapse of the Oslo Peace process in the summer of 2000 and the rapid transformation from partner to enemy makes for a compelling case study. In June 2000 both Arafat and Barak had initiated final status negotiations over, among other things, the future of Jerusalem. Yet within two months full-scale violence had returned. If the success of Oslo had required a transformation of enemies into partners, it follows that the intensity of violence that broke out in September 2000 required an equally dramatic return to the demonized stereotypes that had defined the conflict for so long (Rowland 2002: 3).

A representational sample of the cartoons that appeared between June and November 2000 reveal such a shift, with an alarmingly rapid transformation from adversarial to enemy images evident. This paper examines the change in the depiction of 'other' that accompanied the collapse of the Peace process and the outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada. The image of the 'other' as shrewd, reluctant or conniving negotiator quickly degenerated into that of a barbaric, animalistic and immoral nemeses. Cartoons were drawn from three major Palestinian newspapers - *Al Quds*, *Al-Hayyat Al-Jadeeda* and *Al-Ayyam* - and the three dominant Israeli dailies - *Ha'aretz*, *Maariv* and *Yediot Achronot* - that collectively represent an impressive 95% of the Israeli and Palestinian readership (JMCC 1998 #29; Limor 2000: 2). My fieldwork to the region allowed me to collect a unique data set compiled of over 3500 cartoons. This is a picture of the archives at the Moshe Dayan Institute in Tel Aviv. My research was informed by interviews with Palestinian and Israeli cartoonists, as well as discussions with everyday Israelis and Palestinians. Language translation was done with the help of Palestinians and Israelis, respectively, to ensure accuracy not only of language but of symbol and context as well.

Coding for this paper utilizes Keen's 'enemy' archetypes. In his 1988 study, he examined war-time enemy representations in the first half of the twentieth century and found in roughly 300 political cartoons and posters. His findings show the consistency of en-


enemy representations that he categorized into enemy archetypes. Enemies are perceived as either (1) *aggressors*; (2) *faceless threats*; (3) *enemies of God*; (4) *barbarians*; (5) *imperialists*; (6) *criminals or rogue actors*; (7) *sadists*; (8) *rapist and Infanticiders*; (9) *vermin and animals*; or (10) *death incarnate* (Keen, 1988; Conner 1998: 98). The emergence of one of these images, I argue, is a significant shift in the symbolic system underlying security policy because of its impact on the behavior of actors. As discussed earlier, the acceptability of negotiation or permissiveness of force is affected by whether the enemy is portrayed as “barbarous, bloodthirsty, and cruel – or, alternatively, weak desperate and cowardly” (Duss 2001: 983).

Israeli Cartoons

The Israeli cartoons were drawn from the three main Israeli dailies, *Haaretz*, *Yediot Achronot* and *Maariv*. *Haaretz*, founded in 1919, represents the oldest newspaper in Israel (Viser 2003: 115). Its reputation for balance makes it popular in both Palestinian and Israeli academic circles. Founded in 1939, *Yediot Achronot* is Israel’s most widely read newspaper, servicing over two thirds of Israeli readers. *Maariv*, founded in 1948, has long represented the mainstream alternative to *Ha’aretz* and a less sensationalist alternative to *Yediot Achronot* (Limor 2000: 2).

The June 25th Israeli offer to relinquish 98% of the disputed territories and offer Jerusalem as a shared capital shattered deeply entrenched Israeli taboos, reflecting the length and breadth of the distance they had gone in the interests of peace. Difficult as these were, it was the rejection by Arafat that was beyond comprehension. When offered an internationally recognized country, an end to hostility and the preferred choice of capital, Arafat and the Palestinians had refused. The rejection was completely incompatible with the actions of a leader seeking nationalist self-determination for his people. The only possible explanation for the Israelis was that Arafat was either irrational, or that he had ulterior motives. A growing sentiment emerged that perhaps the Palestinians were not interested in peace after all, and that the process had simply been a strategic attempt to lull the Jewish state into a false sense of complacency, facilitating a more sinister agenda.

During the Oslo peace process, Arafat had increasingly been seen as an elusive negotiator. In June 2000, as final status negotiations loomed, Arafat is depicted as an unwilling to go the distance. In a cartoon that appeared in *Yediot Achronot* on June 7, 2000, both Clinton and Barak are shown to be attempting to bring an obviously reluctant Arafat to the negotiation table.



Yediot Achronot June 7, 2000

Arafat, while unwilling, is not depicted as an enemy. He appears fearful of being caught. He is neither aggressive nor threatening, and Israeli interests are served by capturing him and returning him to the negotiation table. Peace is still the goal, and Arafat's reluctance is the threat to Israeli interests.


As the Camp David talks progressed, a growing sentiment that Arafat's reluctance was an attempt to draw even more concessions from an willing Barak emerged. Arafat's reluctance combined with Israeli eagerness appeared to be the overriding threat to Israel. On July 25, 2000, Arafat rejected Barak's historic offer to divide Jerusalem and present the Palestinian state with 98% of West Bank and Gaza for no more than a Palestinian promise to reign in militants. This was viewed as incomprehensible. A cartoon published in *Maariv* two days later reflected Israeli public opinion turning against the process, viewing Barak single-handedly making concessions to a complacent Palestinian leadership, confidently resting on the Temple Mount. Again, Arafat is not portrayed as menacing but rather as content with the process. For the Israelis, the true threat



Maariv July 27, 2000

to their state was proving to be their own leadership.


The Palestinian rejection had a disconcerting effect on the Israeli public opinion. While



new proposals were being drafted in an effort to salvage the negotiations and secure a peace deal, by August Oslo was clearly in need of rescuing. A Dec 30th 2000 *Ha'aretz* cartoon shows the negotiations in desperate need of rescuing by their patrons. The parties are not partners, neither facing each other, nor, more importantly, joining in a common effort to rescue the other or the process. Though Arafat is not portrayed as

threatening, the increasing sentiment that perhaps this process is not *big enough for the two of us* suggests public opinion turning against the process.

On September 7, 2000, Arafat rejected a modified proposal that sought to address possible Palestinian concerns. More significantly, the rejection was outright, with no Palestinian counter-proposals. Continued negotiations were seen as dangerous. Speculations over the authenticity over Arafat's commitment to peace grew. The September 15, 2000 cartoon in *Haaretz* signals an important shift in Israeli confidence in the peace process. While neither menacing nor evil, Arafat is depicted as dishonest, with Israel unable to take Palestinian intentions at face value. He is increasingly portrayed as distrustful, making false gestures for peace.



Haaretz September 15, 2000

Arafat grows more menacing as tensions between Israelis and Palestinians mount. September ended with flared tempers, stone throwing at the Temple Mount and rioting in Ramallah. The impact on Israeli opinion of the October 3rd death of twelve-year-old



Maariv October 4, 2000

Mohammed Jamal al-Durah in a exchange of gunfire between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants was only worsened by the PA's flagrant use of this child's death in a propaganda campaign. The accusation that Israel murdered al- Durah's and his glorification as a martyr disgusted the Israeli public. The perceived willingness for Palestinians to sacrifice their children was seen as a collective support for infanticide. In a cartoon on October 4,


2000, Arafat is portrayed as an immoral leader, readily sacrificing innocent children while he himself is remaining out of harm's way. The logic of peace with such a leader is questionable.

The failure of September's diplomatic efforts was attributed to Arafat. No longer deemed a reluctant negotiator or dangerous adversary; Arafat was willfully destroying the peace process. The significance of the shift in *Haaretz* representations of Arafat stems from the newspaper's existing editorial policy to deliberate support for the peace process. However, even *Haaretz* could no longer legitimately portray Arafat as a peace partner. He was the enemy of peace, and since peace was in Israel's interests, Arafat's open assault on the peace process made him a threat to Israel. The October 8, 2000 cartoon shows Arafat wildly swinging peace, his characteristic smile now a leer; with the caption reading "*this is my atonement*".



Haaretz October 8, 2000

Increasingly, Arafat was seen to support the peace *process* while being opposed to peace *itself* and the normalization of relations with Israel. The peace process was a



Haaretz November 17, 2000

calculated attempt to garnish international political and economic support. Arafat's claims that he lacked the resources to reign in terror groups was nothing more than an attempt to draw even more concessions from Israel and the international backers of peace. Not only had he failed to make any effort to reign in the terror groups he was increasingly seen as their patron and protector. A November 17, 2000 cartoon shows

Arafat's peace efforts as a perfect shield for terror activities. Terror did not threaten Arafat's peace efforts, but was the reason for them. The peace process diverted world attention from the true Palestinian intention to see the destruction of Israel. Ceasefires were simply strategic attempts to re-arm. Israel had been disarmed by this false diplomacy.

By November 2000, the majority of the Israeli public accepted the Oslo peace process as a failure, despite the best diplomatic efforts to keep the process on life support. Arafat's lament over the end of the process was seen as public showmanship. A November 15, 2000 *Maariv* cartoon shows Arafat as no more than a crocodile crying false tears standing over the graves of Yitchak and Leah Rabin as well as the peace process. The crocodile reflects his true nature, an inhumane lurking menace to Israel, standing over the grave of one of Israel's greatest leaders, who gave his life for the very peace that Arafat destroyed.



Maariv November 15, 2000




By the end of November 2000, Arafat is not longer an enemy of peace, or a shield for militants, but is himself the enemy of Israel. A November 24, 2000 cartoon shows Israel as having been foolishly wooed by a charming Arafat, whose gifts of peace carry with them Israel's demise.

Palestinian Cartoons

Palestinian cartoons tell the story of an increasing disillusionment with the peace process and a worsening depiction of their Israeli peace partners. As the peace process wore on, the promised improvement in Palestinian life never materialized. Israel's delay tactics, continued incursions into autonomous areas and settlement expansions, all took place under the guise of peace talks. Israel was seen as uninterested in seeing the establishment of an independent Palestine, and would only support a peace that saw a weak and controllable state. In short, peace would serve Israeli interests. While Israeli cartoons focused predominantly on Arafat, Palestinian vilification condemned not only Barak, but extended to the army and ordinary Israelis.

The Palestinian cartoons were drawn from the three main Palestinian dailies: *Al Quds*, *Al Hayat Al Jadeeda* and *Al Ayaam*. *Al Quds* was launched in 1968 as the first paper to be published in the occupied territories (Nossek 2003: 187). It is the most established, respected and independent of all Palestinian newspapers (Frisch 1997: 1251). It is also the most widely read (JMCC 1998: #29). This stands in contrast to *Al-Hayat al-Jadida* which was established in 1994 by the newly formed Palestinian Authority (Nossek 2003: 189). It is the highly politicized mouthpiece for the Palestinian authority, and is in no way an independent press (Jamal 2001: 266). Finally, *Al Ayaam*, launched in 1995, constitutes a middle ground between *Al Quds* and *Al Hayat al Jadeeda*. While technically an independent press, its founder Akram Haniya, maintained a close relationship with Yasser Arafat and was a Palestinian negotiator during the Oslo peace process (Nossek 2003: 189).



Al Quds June 12, 2000


For most Palestinians, the June 2000 Camp David negotiations were seen as highly unbalanced, with Israel holding bargaining superiority. While the fairness of the Oslo peace process was highly suspect, Israel was not seen as an enemy.

Palestinians could simply not be expected

to be on a level negotiation field against the self-interested Israelis. A June 12, 2000 *Al Quds* cartoon depicts an Israeli representative holding a far superior position to Palestinian negotiators, unapologetically waving the Israeli flag. They are not so much peace partners as they are unequal participants in a peace process. The Israeli negotiator is not seen as threatening, but rather quite content with the process, which will obviously serve their interests.

As negotiations carried on, Palestinians increasingly blamed the Israeli negotiators for the impasse. A July 13, 2000 *Al Ayaam* cartoon reveals growing sentiment that Barak represented a barrier to, rather than a partner in, peace. Prior to the Barak's July 25,

2000 offer, Israeli negotiators put forward little by way of concessions. Israeli nitpicking over minor details of implementation was evidence of their unwillingness to adhere to the spirit of the peace process. A July 13, 2000 *Al Ayaam* cartoon shows a willing Arafat working beside, but not with Barak,



Al Ayaam July 13, 2000

who is clearly not negotiating in good faith. The cartoon conveys the perceived futility of negotiating with Barak, with parties not seeing eye to eye. While Barak poses no threat, he offers no benefit to Palestinians. The peace process is an empty diplomatic effort.

By July 2000, with Palestinian frustration mounting, negotiations appeared more antagonistic. Barak's offer not only failed to acknowledge Palestinian willingness to relinquish over 60% of historic Palestine, but



Al Hayat Al Jadeeda
July 11, 2000

constituted an Israeli insult to injury by seeking to further expand the 1967 borders. The hardening of negotiations is evident in a July 11, 2000 *Al Hayat Al Jaddeda* cartoon in which Oslo has become a showdown. Barak, assuming an aggressive stance, forces Arafat to stand in defense of Palestinian interests. Barak is increasingly seen as a threat to the future of Palestine.

The American-brokered Camp David summit appeared to reinforce the sense of unevenness in the negotiations. The American leader's support of Israel is revealed in the blame Clinton placed on Arafat for threatening the peace process. The reality of the situation, however, was that an Israeli-American conspiracy is responsible for the demise of the peace process, with the American supporting positions that Palestinians simply could not accept. An August 1, 2000 *Al Quds* cartoon shows Barak congratulating Clinton on suffocating peace efforts.



Al Quds August 1, 2000

In August 2000, negotiations stall as Israeli negotiators refuse to discuss Palestinian sovereignty over Al-Haram al-Sharif or any other Muslim holy sites in *Al Quds*. September sees increasing confrontation between Israeli security forces and Palestinians protesters. A September 3, 2000 cartoon shows a dramatic transformation of representation, as Israel is cast as an enemy. Israel is no longer represented by its



Al Hayat al Jadeeda September 3, 2000

nationalist secular leadership, but seen as a violent ogre. Negotiations with Israel are futile, as the conflict is portrayed as a confrontation with barbarians who threaten Muslim holy sites. Israeli designs for Al-Haram al-Sharif more clearly evident. Israel is not only the enemy of Palestinians but is just as much an enemy of God.

The passing of September 13, 2000, the expected Palestinian Independence Day, with no prospect for statehood, was only worsened by the visit by the despised Ariel Sharon to Al-Haram al-Sharif on

September 28, 2000, which symbolically demonstrated Israeli control over Muslim holy sites. When protests erupted in Ramallah, Israeli soldiers opened fire on Palestinian students. Israel was increasingly viewed as a ruthless conqueror. The image



Al Ayaam October 10, 2000

of the immoral occupier had returned. It was the death of Mohammed Jamal al-Durah on October 3, 2000 that revealed the depths of the Israeli arrogance, murdering a twelve-year-old child in the arms of his father, indifferent to the presence of international media. Israel was an evil force with blood on its hands with whom no negotiations were possible. The Israeli army was an immoral agent, making ultimatums. An October 10, 2000, an *Al Ayaam* cartoon captures this sentiment of Israel as a soulless menacing figure. Israel was an ever-present threat to Palestinians.

October 2000 witnesses the most intense fighting since the start of the Oslo peace process. The lynching of two Israeli officers by a Palestinian mob was met with Israeli fury. Israeli helicopters slammed missiles into Arafat's headquarters, Palestinian police

stations and media outlets. The intensity of fighting transformed Israel from resistant



Al Ayaam November 1, 2000

negotiator to a figure of animalistic savagery. A November 1, 2000 *Al Ayaam* cartoon reveals Barak's true nature, not as source of peace, but a creature of the night who reigns death from above. Israel was a force of evil against whom any moral agent must fight. The symbolic system that had made Oslo possible was dead.

Conclusion

This paper argues that cartoon analysis offer insight into the nature, intensity and durability of conflict. While the correlation between the changes in 'enemy' construction and the shifts in political behavior is a necessary precondition for warfare, they are not often clearly observable by external parties. The rapid shift from peace negotiations to open conflict that occurred in between August and October 2000 required such a transformation. The killing of a Palestinian child or Israeli claims to *Haram Al Sharif* were not new phenomena. What made the death of al-Durah and Sharon's visit to the Temple mount significant was that they correlated and validated a shift in the perception of 'other' that had already occurred in both the Israeli and Palestinian opinion.

As an internal form of discourse which is shielded from external scrutiny, political cartoons possess an unapologetic capacity to capture the emotionally charged, contentious and emergent shifts in opinion. The analytical potential of cartoon analysis thus lies in providing insight into the undercurrents of public sentiment in situations where significant shifts in opinion may have dire consequence, such as in the case of growing disillusionment on both sides with an ongoing peace process.

Bibliography

Barnett, M. (1996). : Identity and Alliances in the Middle East. Alternative Perspectives on National Security. P. J. Katzenstein. New York, Columbia University Press.

Barnett, M. (2002). The Israeli Identity and the Peace Process. Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East. S. M. B. Telhami. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Bowker, R. (2003). Palestinian Refugees: Mythology, Identity, and the Search for Peace. Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Calhoun, C. (1995). * Social Theory and the Politics of Identity. Oxford, UK, Blackwell.

Cohen, A. A. (1998). Framing the Intifada: People and Media. A. A. G. W. Cohen. New York, Columbia University Press.

Conner, J. L. (1998). "Hussein as Enemy: the Persian Gulf War in Political Cartoons." Press Politics. 3(3): 96-114.

Duus, P. (2001). "Presidential address: Weapons of the Weak, Weapons of the Strong--the development of the Japanese Political Cartoon." Journal of Asian Studies 60(4): 965.

Entman, R. M. (1993). "Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm." Journal of Communication. 43(4): 51.

Entman, R. M. (2004). Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy. London, University of Chicago Press.

Frisch, H. H. (1997). "State Formation and International Aid: The Emergence of the Palestinian Authority." World Development **25**(8): 1243-1255.

Gamson, W. A. D. S. (1992). "Media Discourse as a Symbolic Contest: the Bomb in Political Cartoons." *Sociological Forum* 7(1).

Gamson, W. A. A. M. (1989). "Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach." *American Journal of Sociology* 95(1).

Giarelli, E. L. T. (2003). "Methodological Issues in the Use of Published Cartoons as Data." *Qualitative Health Research* 13(7): 945-956.

Gilmartin, P. S. D. B. (1998). "The Representation of Women in Political Cartoons of the 1995 World Conference on Women." *Women's Studies International Forum* 21(5): 535 - 549.

Goertzel, T. (1993). "The Gulf War as a Mental Disorder: A Statistical Test of DeMause's Hypothesis." Political Psychology **14**: 711-723.

Greenberg, J. (2002). "Framing and Temporality in Political Cartoons: A Critical Analysis of Visual News Discourse." *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 39: 181-219.

Hall, S. (2002). "Introduction: Who Needs 'Identity'?" in Questions of Cultural Identity. S. P. d. G. Hall. London, Sage Publications.

Jamal, A. (2001). "State-Building and Media Regime: Censoring the Emerging Public Sphere in Palestine." Gazette **63**(2-3): 263-282.

Jepperson, R. L. A. W. P. J. K. (1996). "Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security" in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. P. J. Katzenstein. New York, Columbia University Press.

JMCC (1998). JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 29: On Palestinian and Media. Jerusalem, Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre.

Katzenstein, P. J. (1996). Alternative Perspectives on National Security. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. P. J. Katzenstein. New York, Columbia University Press.

Keashly, L., & Ronald J. Fisher (1996). A Contingency Perspective on Conflict Intervention: theoretical and Practical Considerations. Resolving International conflict: The theory and PRactice of Mediation. J. Bercovitch. Boulder, Lynne Reinner.

Keen, Sam Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination. (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1988)

Khan, M. A. M. (2004). Jihad for Jerusalem: Identity and Strategy in International Relations. London, Praeger.

Kowert, P. J. L. (1996). Norms, Identity and their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. P. J. Katzenstein. New York, Columbia University Press.

Limor, Y. (2000). The Printed Media- Israel's Newspapers, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Luostarinen, Heikki "Finnish Russophobia: The Story of Enemy Image" Journal of Peace Research, vol. 26 no. 2 1989 p. 125).

Morris, R. (1993). "Visual Rhetoric in Political Cartoons: A Structuralist Approach." *Metaphor and Symbolic Activity*. 8(3): 195-210.

McSweeney, B. (1999). Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Miall, H. (2001). Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task. Berlin, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Nossek, H. R., Khalil (2003). "Censorship and Freedom of the Press under Changing Political Regimes." International Journal for Communication Studies 65(2): 183-202.

Omri, M.-S. (1998) "Gulf Laughter Break": Cartoons in Tunisia during the Gulf War. *Political Cartoons in the Middle East*. F. M. E. Göçek. Princeton, Markus Wiener Publishers.

Press, C. (1981). *The Political Cartoon*. New Jersey, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.

Ramsbotham, O. (2005). "The Analysis of Protracted Social Conflict: a tribute to Edward Azar." Review of International Studies 31: 109-126.

Reimann, C. (2001). Towards conflict transformation: Assessing the State-of-the-Art in Conflict Management - Reflections from a theoretical Perspective. Berlin, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Rowland, R. C. F., David (2002). Shared Land/ Conflicting Identity: Trajectories of Israeli and Palestinian Symbol Use. East Lansing, Michigan State University Press.

Slymovics, S. (1993). " Cartoon Commentary: Algerian and Moroccan Caricature from the Gulf War." Middle East Report 180: 21-24.

Tunç, A. (2002). "Pushing the Limits of Tolerance: Functions of Political Cartoonists in the Democratization Process: The Case of Turkey." International Journal for Communication Studies 64(1): 47-62.

Schultz, H. L. (1999). The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism: Between revolution and Statehood. Manchester, Manchester University Press.

Stein, J. G. (1996). Image, Identity and the Resolution of Violent conflict. Turbulent Peace. C. A. H. Crocker, Fen Osler & Aal, Pamela. Washington, United States Institute of Peace Press.

Telhani, S. M. B., Ed. (2002). Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Våyren, T. (2001). Culture and International Conflict Resolution: A critical analysis of the work of John Burton. Manchester, Manchester University Press.

Viser, M. (2003). "Attempted Objectivity: An Analysis of the New York Times and Ha'aretz and Their Portrayals of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict." Politics 8(4).

Wolfsfeld, G. (2001). "The News Media and the Second Intifada: Some Initial Lessons." Press/ Politics 6(4): 113-118.

Zartman, I. W. (2001). "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments." The global Review of Ethnopolitics 1(1): 8-18.